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Abstract
In this paper I study the relation between real wage rigidity (RWR) and nominal
price and wage rigidity. I show that in a standard DSGE model RWR is mainly
aﬀected by the interaction of the two nominal rigidities and not by other structural
parameters. The degree of RWR is, however, considerably inﬂuenced by the mod-
elling assumption about the structure of wage contracts (Calvo vs. Taylor) and
about other institutional characteristics of wage-setting (clustering of contracts,
heterogeneous contract length, indexation). I use survey evidence on price- and
wage-setting for 15 European countries to calculate the degrees of RWR implied by
the theoretical model. The average levels of RWR are broadly in line with empirical
estimates based on macroeconomic data. In order to be able to also match the ob-
served cross-country variation in RWR it is, however, essential to move beyond the
country-speciﬁc durations of price and wages and to take more institutional details
into account.
Keywords: Inﬂation Persistence, Real Wage Rigidity, Nominal Wage Rigidity, DSGE
models, Staggered Contracts
JEL-Classiﬁcation: E31, E32, E24, J515
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Non-Technical Summary
Nominal and real wage rigidities have a long tradition in the explanation of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. The recent years have shown a particular interest in the issue of real wage
rigidity (RWR) since its introduction improves the explanatory power of otherwise stan-
dard models. By breaking the “divine coincidence” of standard New Keynesian models it
leads, for example, to more realistic trade-oﬀs for monetary policy (Blanchard and Gal´ ı,
2007). Similarly, it also oﬀers a straightforward solution to the famous “Shimer puzzle”
(Shimer, 2005; Hall, 2005).
As far as the reasons behind the rigidity of real wages are concerned, however, there
does not exist much agreement. Explanations range from the existence of social norms
to the presence of sequential real wage bargaining and often RWR is simply assumed in
a short-cut formulation without specifying the exact source of the rigidity (Blanchard
and Gal´ ı, 2007). None of the existing approaches deals explicitly with the possibility
that RWR could simply be understood as the consequence of two nominal rigidities: a
nominal price and a nominal wage rigidity. This parsimonious explanation is, however, a
core element of New Keynesian DSGE models of the business cycle and it is the starting
point of this paper. In particular, I study how the two nominal rigidities interact to create
a RWR, how sensitive real wage rigidities react to changes in the nominal rigidities and to
what extent the use of available information on price- and wage-setting is able to generate
degrees of RWR that are in line with empirical evidence.
The derivations are based on the model by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). It is
shown that the model leads to a solution that involves an explicit and straightforward
measure of RWR. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the two nominal rigidities are the main
determinants of the degree of RWR. The solutions of the forward-looking New Keynesian
model can also be written in a form that is very similar to a backward-looking Phillips
curve speciﬁcation. I show that the derived expression is closely related to the traditional
“triangle” model (cf. Gordon, 1998) and that the weight of past inﬂation in this expression
is identical to the measure of RWR.
In order to analyze how the degree of RWR implied by the EHL model corresponds
to the empirical evidence, I use recent data on wage-setting practices in Europe. In
particular, I take the survey evidence from the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of the
ESCB that has collected a multitude of data on price- and wage-setting in 15 European
countries (see Durant et al., 2009). A closer look at these data reveals that there exist
at least four dimensions along which the assumptions about wage-setting in the basic6
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model with Calvo wage contracts are problematic. First, the majority of wage agreements
seems to follow a predetermined pattern with given contract lengths. Second, while for
most contracts (≈ 60%) this predetermined length is one year there exists also some
heterogeneity in this context and a nonnegligible share of contracts has longer or shorter
durations. Third, existing data suggest that in many countries new contracts are clustered
in certain months (mostly in January). Fourth, wage indexation is a widespread practice
in some countries. In order to account for these important institutional characteristics of
actual wage-setting practices, I also solve the model under the assumption of Taylor wage
contracts allowing also for the possibility of heterogeneous contract length, clustering and
indexation. The results show that the model with standard Taylor wage contracts involves
a considerable smaller degree of RWR than the model with Calvo contracts. Furthermore,
the degree of RWR decreases in the share of ﬂexible wages and the extent of asymmetric
sector sizes and it increases in the prevalence of wage indexation.
In the empirical part of the paper I use the information from the WDN together
with standard values for other structural parameters in order to calculate measures of
RWR that are implied by the theoretical model under diﬀerent assumptions about the
features of wage-setting. For the standard models the implied values of quarterly RWR
are between 0.6 and 0.8. These values are in line with empirical estimations and also with
the assumptions that are typically made in models with short-cut formulations for RWR.
The model with Calvo contracts and with standard Taylor contracts are, however, unable
to match the observed cross-country variations of RWR. This follows from the fact that
the average price and wage durations are rather similar across countries. In order to get a
better agreement with the cross-country variation one has to take additional institutional
characteristics (with respect to clustering, contract length heterogeneity and indexation)
of wage-setting into account.7
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1 Introduction
The simplest explanation for the existence of real wage rigidities sees them as a conse-
quence of two nominal rigidities: a nominal price rigidity and a nominal wage rigidity.
Although this type of real wage rigidity is a crucial element of the current generation of
DSGE models (cf. Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003) it is usually not in
the focus of these papers and has so far not been analyzed in any detail.1 In this paper
I want to ﬁll this gap. In particular, I am going to study how the two nominal rigidi-
ties interact to create real wage rigidity (RWR), how sensitive real wage rigidities react
to changes in the nominal rigidities and to what extent the use of available information
on price- and wage-setting is able to generate degrees of RWR that are in line with the
empirical evidence.
Nominal and real wage rigidities have a long tradition in the explanation of business
cycle ﬂuctuations. While the concept of nominal wage rigidity is commonly related to
the speed with which nominal wages can be changed in reaction to economic shocks,
there seems to exist less unanimity about the exact meaning of real wage rigidity. The
deﬁnition by Blanchard (2006) can serve as a useful reference point: “‘Real wage rigidities’
[capture] the speed at which real wages [adjust] to changes in warranted real wages [...].
The slower the adjustment, the higher and the longer lasting the eﬀects of adverse shocks
on unemployment” (Blanchard, 2006, p. 16). In the benchmark labor market model with
complete ﬂexibility the “warranted real wage” is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. In formal terms this ﬂex-price labor market equilibrium
can thus be written as: ωt = mrst,w h e r eωt and mrst are the logarithms of the real wage
and the marginal rate of substitution, respectively.
The recent years have shown an increased interest in the issue of RWR. This has
to do with the fact that the introduction of RWR improves the explanatory power of
otherwise standard models. Hall (2005) and Milgrom and Hall (2008), e.g., have shown
that RWR oﬀers a straightforward solution to the famous “Shimer puzzle” (Shimer, 2005).
Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007), on the other hand, have argued that RWR is a reasonable
way to break the “divine coincidence” of standard New Keynesian models, to re-establish
more plausible eﬀects of disinﬂations and more realistic trade-oﬀs for monetary policy.
As far as the reasons behind the rigidities of real wages are concerned, however, there
does not exist much agreement. Blanchard and Katz (1999), in an early contribution,
1Some discussions about this issue can be found in Woodford (2003, 231f.) and in Rabanal and
Ram´ ırez (2005).8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1180
April 2010
present a model in which unemployment beneﬁts and wages react diﬀerently to changes
in productivity growth. Hall (2005), on the other hand, uses a model where RWR follows
from the existence of social norms while Hall and Milgrom (2008) present an argument
based on sequential (real) wage bargaining. Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007), ﬁnally, simply
assume that the real wage ωt is rigid for whatever reason and can be written as: ωt =
γωt−1+(1−γ)mrst,w h e r eγ is their measure of RWR. In an appendix they motivate this
short-cut formulation by referring to a model with “real wage staggering”. Interestingly,
however, none of these papers deals explicitly with the possibility that RWR could simply
be understood as the consequence of two nominal rigidities: a nominal price and a nominal
wage rigidity. This parsimonious explanation is, however, a core element of New Keynesian
(and also old Keynesian) models of the business cycle and it is the starting point of this
paper. In particular, I will investigate whether the parsimonious model implies a RWR
that is broadly in line with the empirical evidence.
My derivations are based on the model by Erceg, Henderson and Levin [EHL] (2000).
This is the benchmark model in the DSGE literature where both nominal price and
nominal wage rigidities are introduced via Calvo contracts (Calvo, 1983). The EHL model
leads to a solution of the form ωt = δ∗ ωt−1 + f (output gap,supply shocks), where f(·)i s
a linear function of the stated variables. Since the output gap itself can be expressed as a
function of the marginal rate of substitution this equation is in fact close to the short-cut
relation in Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007). The parameter δ∗ measures RWR in the EHL
model. I show that the two nominal rigidities are the main determinants of the degree of
RWR and that δ∗ reacts rather insensitive to changes in the other structural parameters.
The solutions of the forward-looking New Keynesian model can also be written in a form
that is very similar to a backward-looking Phillips curve speciﬁcation. I show that the
derived expression is closely related to the traditional “triangle” model (cf. Gordon, 1998)






In order to analyze how the degree of RWR implied by the EHL model corresponds to
the empirical evidence, I use recent data on wage-setting practices in Europe. In partic-
ular, I take the survey evidence from the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of the ESCB
that has collected a multitude of data on price- and wage-setting in 15 European countries
(see Durant et al., 2009). A closer look at these data reveals that there exist at least four
dimensions along which the assumptions about wage-setting in the basic EHL model are
problematic. First, the majority of wage agreements seems to follow a predetermined
pattern with given contract lengths. In other words, the ubiquitous assumption of Calvo9
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wage contracts in which the hazard rate of wage changes is constant is contradicted for
all countries. Second, while for most contracts (≈ 60%) this predetermined length is
one year there exists also some heterogeneity in this context and a nonnegligible share
of contracts has longer or shorter durations. Third, existing data suggest that in many
countries new contracts are clustered in certain months (mostly in January). Fourth,
wage indexation is a widespread practice in some countries. In order to account for these
important institutional characteristics of actual wage-setting practices, I also solve the
EHL model under the assumption of Taylor wage contracts, i.e. contracts with a ﬁxed
and predetermined length (cf. Taylor, 1980). In light of the additional characteristics of
real-world wage-setting practices, I also allow for a certain percentage of ﬂexible wages,
for the fact that the sectors might be of diﬀerent size and for partial wage indexation.
The solution to this model is somewhat more involved than the one for the model
with Calvo wage contracts. It can, however, again be written in a way that contains
an analogous measure of RWR. Comparing the diﬀerent measures of RWR leads to two
conclusions. First, the model with standard Taylor wage contracts involves a considerable
smaller degree of RWR than the model with Calvo contracts. Second, the degree of RWR
decreases in the share of ﬂexible wages and the extent of asymmetric sector sizes and it
increases in the prevalence of wage indexation. The largest impact can be observed for
the share of ﬂexible wages. Taking all of these elements into account gives a richer and
less uniform picture than the model with Calvo contracts.
In the next step, I use the information from the WDN together with standard values
for other structural parameters in order to calculate the measure for RWR that is implied
by the theoretical model under diﬀerent assumptions about the features of wage-setting.
For the basic EHL model with Calvo wage contracts the average model-based estimate of
annual RWR comes out as 0.35 while it is 0.17 for the standard Taylor model (i.e., with
symmetric sector sizes and without taking ﬂexible wages and indexation into account).
These year-on-year (yoy) values correspond to quarter-on-quarter (qoq) values of 0.77 and
0.64, respectively. These ﬁgures are within the range of values for γ that are typically
assumed in the models that are based on the short-cut formulation for RWR. Blanchard
and Gal´ ı (2007), e.g., use illustrative values for γ between 0.5 and 0.9, Duval and Vogel
(2007) employ values between 0.79 and 0.93, while Faia (2008) and Blanchard and Gal´ ı
(2008) calibrate γ =0 .6a n dγ =0 .5, respectively.
In a further step, I use macroeconomic time series data (mostly from 1990 to 2007) to
provide estimates of RWR for the same group of 15 European countries. The average qoq
RWR comes out as 0.7. This is close to the values of qoq RWR that are implied by the10
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standard EHL models. If one focuses not only on the average value of RWR but also on
the variations across countries, then the agreement with the data is less convincing. While
the empirical estimations result in an average standard deviation of qoq RWR across the
15 European countries of 0.26, it is only 0.02 for the values based on the EHL model with
Calvo or with standard Taylor wage contracts. The reason for this nonconformity is that
the average durations of prices and wages as reported in Durant et al. (2009) are very
similar across the 15 European countries and this is reﬂected in the similar implied levels
of RWR.
Taking the additional dimensions of wage-setting practices into account leads to a
more diﬀerentiated picture. The average RWR decreases (but remains in the range of
plausible values), whereas the cross-country variation increases and also the ranking of
countries with respect to RWR changes. This follows from the fact that cross-country
diﬀerences in the additional institutional characteristics are more pronounced. In some
countries, e.g., automatic wage indexation is a particularly widespread phenomenon, while
in other countries the share of short-term contracts is unusually high etc. Taken together,
the results imply that one should take these institutional characteristics into account in
order to get a realistic picture of the transmission process and of the prevalent frictions
in diﬀerent economies. If this is done then the results suggest that the parsimonious EHL
model does in fact oﬀer a reasonable explanation for the important phenomenon of real
wage rigidity.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I present the standard EHL
model with Calvo price and wage contracts and I derive the measure of RWR. In section
3, I study how the introduction of Taylor wage contracts and of asymmetric sector sizes,
ﬂexible wage and indexation changes the results. In section 4, I discuss the evidence of
the WDN and I calculate measures of RWR that are implied by the theoretical model.
For this I use the survey evidence on price- and wage-setting for 15 European countries
and I compare these ﬁgures to the results of empirical estimations. Section 5 concludes.11
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2 The basic model with nominal price and nominal
wage rigidities ` al aC a l v o
2.1 The set-up of the model
I use the standard model with sticky prices and wages by Erceg, Henderson and Levin
[EHL] (2000). In order to facilitate the comparison with the existing literature I use the
exact set-up and notation of the model that is presented in chapter 6 of Gal´ ı (2008) where
one can also ﬁnd details on the derivation of the linearized solutions of the microfounded
model. The model assumes that there exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms that produce diﬀerentiated products where εp stands for the elasticity of substitution
among the product varieties. There exists a Calvo constraint on price-setting and each
period only a fraction (1 − θp) can reset their price while a fraction θp leaves the price
unchanged The average duration of a price is thus given by
1
1−θp. Nominal wage rigidity
is introduced in a similar fashion. In particular, it is assumed that each household is
specialized in one particular type of labor for which he is the monopolistic supplier and
where each ﬁrm needs all diﬀerentiated labor types to produce its diﬀerentiated product.
Households are subject to a similar Calvo constraint and in each period only a fraction
(1−θw) can freely adjust the wage rate. The elasticity of substitution among the diﬀerent
types of labor is denoted by εw.
The production function for ﬁrm i is given by: Yt(i)=AtNt(i)1−α,w h e r eNt(i)i sa n
index of labor inputs used in the production of good Yt(i). The period utility function of
a representative household is given by: U(C,N)=C1−σ
1−σ − N1+ϕ
1+ϕ .G a l ´ ı (2008) shows that










t+1 + κw˜ yt − λw˜ ωt (2)

















+ Et˜ yt+1 (4)




t + φy˜ yt + vt, (5)
where π
p
t = pt −pt−1 and πw
t = wt −wt−1 denote price and wage inﬂation, respectively, it
2These equations correspond to (15), (17), (18), (19) and (20) in chapter 6 of Gal´ ı (2008).12
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is the nominal interest rate, ωt ≡ wt − pt is the real wage, ˜ yt ≡ yt − yn
t is the output gap
and ˜ ωt ≡ ωt − ωn
t the real wage gap. The level of natural output yn
t that is used in the
deﬁnition of the output gap refers to the equilibrium level of output that would prevail in
the absence of both price and wage rigidities. Similarly, the natural real wage ωn
t and the
natural real interest rate rn
t correspond to the real wage rate and the real interest rate in

























is the log of the desired markup of ﬁrms and where ¯ ωn ≡ log(1 −
α)−μp is deﬁned as the real wage that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities
and in the absence of technological shocks.
Equation (1) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve where inﬂation now also depends on
the real wage gap. Equation (2) is a similar equation for wage inﬂation with the only
diﬀerence that a positive wage gap will decrease wage inﬂation by moderating wage claims.
(3) is an identity relating various measures of the real wage and inﬂation, (4) is the usual
forward-looking IS curve and (5) is the monetary policy rule.
The various parameters in (1) to (8) are given as follows:
λp =
(1 − θp)(1− βθp)
θp
1 − α





(1 − θw)(1− βθw)
θw (1 + εwϕ)


















and φp, φw and φy are non-negative coeﬃcients that denote the strength with which the
central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to price inﬂation, wage inﬂation
and the output gap, respectively. Furthermore, ρ ≡−logβ where β is the discount factor.
The technology shocks at and the interest rate shock vt are given by the AR(1) processes:
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vt = ρvvt−1 + ε
v
t, (10)
where ρa ∈ [0,1], ρv ∈ [0,1] and εa
t and εv
t are uncorrelated zero mean white noise












2.2 Measuring real wage rigidity
I am interested in the implications of the model for real wage rigidity. For this purpose it










t+1 +( κw − κp)˜ yt − (λw + λp)˜ ωt (12)
Using the deﬁnitions for πω
t ,˜ ωt and ωt one can derive from (12) a second-order diﬀerence
equation for the real wage ωt:
ωt =
1
1+β + λw + λp
[ωt−1 + βEtωt+1 +( κw − κp)˜ yt +( λw + λp)ω
n
t ] (13)
Equation (13) can be solved to get:3















1 − 4β˜ λ2
2β˜ λ
, (15)
where ˜ λ ≡ 1
1+β+λw+λp. δ is a ﬁrst approximate measure for the extent of real wage rigidity
in the EHL model. It is, however, not the ultimate solution since also future variables
that are present in (14) might depend on past levels of the real wage. In order to derive
the general solution one has to use the complete model, in particular the assumptions
about how the output gaps ˜ yt+s are determined.
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2.3 Real wage rigidities under the assumption of exogenous out-
put
Before turning to the solution that is implied by the complete EHL model (that includes
the forward-looking IS-curve (4) and the monetary policy rule (5) to pin down the values
of ˜ yt+s) I want to start with the simple assumption that the output is exogenously given
and always equal to its natural level yn
t , i.e. ˜ yt =0 ,∀t.4 Using (8) and (9) in (14) it
follows that:









In the case of exogenous output the root δ captures the degree of real wage rigidity. One
can use (15) to derive a straightforward and at the same time crucial result: The rigidity
measure δ goes to zero if either λw or λp go to inﬁnity or, equivalently, if either θp or θw
are equal to zero (see appendix A.1). As a consequence, real wages are ﬂexible (δ =0 )i f
either prices or wages are ﬂexible. As one would have expected, only the combination of
nominal price and nominal wage rigidity creates real wage rigidity.
In the next section, I will show that this conclusion still holds for the more general
case where the output gap is not assumed to be equal to zero. In fact, it will come out
that the degree of real wage rigidity in the more general framework is also quantitatively
similar to δ.
2.4 Real wage rigidities in the EHL model
For the full EHL model consisting of equations (1) to (8) it is not possible anymore to
derive a closed form solution for the degree of RWR. One can use, however, standard
methods to solve the model numerically. In particular, in appendix A.2 I show that the




3vt,w h e r ex ∈{ πp, ˜ y,ω} and Ψx
0 to
Ψx
3 are coeﬃcients.5 The coeﬃcient Ψω
1 in the expression for ωt thus provides a measure
for RWR in the EHL model. I prefer, however, to focus on a slightly diﬀerent measure
that uses the solution for ˜ yt to substitute out for the interest rate shock vt. Appendix A.2
reports the resulting expressions for ωt and π
p
t. In particular, the evolution of the real
4This model thus closely resembles a RBC model with ﬁxed labor supply and a real wage rigidity
(caused by the existence of two nominal rigidities).
5It is also shown in appendix A.2 how to write these policy functions in an equivalent way in terms
of deviations of the real wage from the steady state value ¯ ωn. In particular for x ∈{ πp, ˜ y,(ω − ¯ ωn)} one
gets: xt =Ψ x
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5 ˜ yt +Ψ
ω
6, (17)
where δ∗ and Ψω
4 to Ψω
6 are deﬁned in appendix A.2. I choose the coeﬃcient δ∗ in (17) as
the measure of real wage rigidity in the EHL model since it is closely related to the existing
literature and allows for straightforward comparisons among diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The degree of (annual) RWR is illustrated in Figure 1 that also includes—as a comparison—
the (annual) RWR from the model with exogenous output (cf. (16)). For the illustrations
I use the standard calibration of the parameters as in Gal´ ı (2009). The only diﬀerence is
that Gal´ ı (2009) deﬁnes a quarter as the basic time unit while I use a semester for this
purpose. This is done to later alleviate comparisons to a model with two-period Taylor
wage contracts (in particular when sector sizes are asymmetric).6 In using a semester
as the basic time unit one has to be careful in correctly calibrating the parameters that
govern the degree of nominal rigidity. In particular, an average price duration of 3 quar-
ters corresponds to θp =1 /3 while an average wage duration of 4 quarters corresponds to
θw =1 /2. These are the baseline values for the duration of price and wage contracts used
by Gal´ ı (2009) and I will refer to this in the following as the “baseline calibration”.7
Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 shows that in the absence of nominal price rigidity (θp = 0) the real wage
rigidity is zero. The same is true for the case of completely ﬂexible wages (θw =0 )w h e r e
δ∗ and δ also approach zero. For the baseline calibration one gets a sizable degree of
annual RWR given by (δ∗)
2 =0 .31 (which corresponds to a qoq RWR of 0.75).
δ∗ reacts only very weakly to changes in the parameters σ, ϕ, φπ and φy.T h el a r g e s t
eﬀects one can observe for changes in α, εp and εw.8 For the usual range of parameter
values, however, the measure of annual RWR is fairly stable and stays between 0.25 and
0.32. Overall these robustness checks show that the main determinants of the degree of
6In section 3.4 I discuss some issues related to the structure of timing more extensively.
7The rest of the parameters is calibrated as: α =1 /3, β =0 .98 (corresponding to an annual real
interest rate of roughly 4%), σ =1 ,ϕ =5 ,εp =6 ,εw =4 .52, φπ =1 .5, φy =0 .125, and φw =0 . T h e
calibration in chapter 6 of Gal´ ı (2008) is similar with the exception that there εw =6 ,ϕ =1a n dφy =0 .
8For σ between 0.5 and 5, (δ∗)
2 stays the same, for ϕ between 0.5 and 5 it increases from 0.25 to
0.32 and for φπ between 1.1 and 10 and φy between 0 and 1 it stays constant at (δ∗)
2 =0 .31. On the
other hand, annual RWR is 0.11 for α = 0 and it is close to 0.62 as α approaches 1. For εp (εw)c l o s et o
one gets values of (δ∗)
2 =0 .17 ((δ∗)
2 =0 .26) which increases to (δ∗)
2 =0 .37 ((δ∗)
2 =0 .33) for εp =1 0
(εw = 10). The extreme values for α, εp and εw are, however, not typical for the calibration of DSGE
models. Furthermore, δ∗ is independent of ρa and very insensitive to ρv.16
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Figure 1: Comparison of the coeﬃcients of annual real wage rigidity (δ2 and (δ∗)
2)i nt h e
speciﬁcations with exogenous and endogenous ˜ yt, respectively.
RWR are the two nominal rigidities. A related issue is whether the degree of RWR that is
implied by the baseline calibration is reasonable and in line with the empirical evidence.
I will come back to this question in section 4.
The main ﬁndings of the last two subsections can be summarized as follows:
Result 1 The combination of nominal price and nominal wage rigidity can give rise to
a considerable degree of real wage rigidity. The assumption of completely ﬂexible prices
(θp =0 ) or completely ﬂexible wages (θw =0 ) implies zero real wage rigidity (δ =0or
δ∗ =0 ).
Result 2 The degree of RWR is primarily determined by the extent of the two nominal
rigidities. It is rather insensitive to changes in the other structural parameters and also to
the speciﬁcation of the monetary policy rule and the determination of output. In particular,
the speciﬁcations with exogenous output and with endogenous output give rise to similar
degrees of RWR.
Result 1 emphasizes in a concentrated form the importance of complementarities (cf.
Ascari, 2003; Huang and Liu, 2002). Nominal price rigidity without nominal wage rigidity
as well as nominal wage rigidity without nominal price rigidity will result in completely
ﬂexible real wages (δ∗ = 0). Only the interplay between the two rigidities causes real wage
rigidity. By the same token, Figure 1 also nicely illustrates that one class of stickiness
increases the size of overall persistence holding the degree of the other stickiness constant.
Note also that one can use (11) to transform (17) into an expression of the form
ωt = δ∗ωt−1 + γ1mrst + γ2at + const. This is fairly close (but nevertheless not identi-17
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cal) to the short-cut formulation in Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007) where they assume that
ωt = γωt−1 +( 1− γ)mrst. This highlights that the measure δ∗ (that is a function of the
two nominal rigidities) is in fact closely related to the degree of RWR that is used in the
models with the simple ad-hoc assumption. Despite this similarity the two models con-
tain, however, diﬀerent transmission and adjustment mechanisms and they have diﬀerent
dynamic properties (see Riggi, 2007).
2.5 Inﬂation persistence and a backward-looking Phillips curve
The rational expectations solution to the EHL model can be transformed into an expres-
sion that resembles a traditional, backward-looking Phillips curve. This formulation is
particularly useful for empirical analyses and also for the later comparisons between the
models with Calvo and with Taylor wage contracts. In appendix A.2 it is shown that one






t−1 + f(˜ yt, ˜ yt−1,a t,a t−1), (18)
where f(·) is a linear function of the listed variables. Equation (18) is in fact fairly similar
to the more traditional “triangle” model (cf. Gordon, 1998) in which the current rate of
inﬂation is written as a function of past inﬂation and of current and past levels of demand
factors (output gap, cyclical unemployment) and supply factors (oil price shocks, import
price shocks etc.). Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on the lagged inﬂation term is identical
to the degree of real wage rigidity in (17). An implication of this ﬁnding is stated as the
following result.
Result 3 T h ed e g r e eo fi n t r i n s i ci n ﬂ a t i o np e r s i s t e n c ei st h es a m ea st h ed e g r e eo fR W R .
If there is no RWR than there will also be no intrinsic inﬂation persistence.
A similar result has also been derived by Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007, 51f.) who have shown
that the presence of their (assumed) RWR leads to intrinsic inﬂation inertia.
3 The model with nominal price rigidities ` al aC a l v o
and nominal wage rigidities ` al aT a y l o r
The EHL model is based on Calvo wage contracts and Calvo price contracts. This is the
standard assumption that dominates the DSGE literature. In recent years, however, this18
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assumption has also been criticized as being restrictive and implausible. In particular, it
has been argued that a constant hazard rate for wage contracts is at odds with the empir-
ical evidence (cf. Gottfries and S¨ oderberg, 2008). Recent survey data by the WDN—that
I will discuss more extensively in chapter 4—underline this criticism. In particular, there
are at least four dimensions along which the data contradict the basic model with Calvo
contracts. First, the majority of wage agreements seems to follow a predetermined pattern
with given contract lengths. Second, while for most contracts this predetermined length
is one year (on average 60% in the WDN survey) there exists also some heterogeneity
in this context and a nonnegligible share of contracts has longer (26%) or shorter (12%)
durations. Third, 54% of the ﬁrms asked in the WDN survey have indicated that they
carry out wage changes in a particular month (most of them—30%—in January).9 Fourth,
15% of all ﬁrms report to use automatic indexation of wages to the rate of inﬂation. In
order to be able to take these real-world characteristics of wage-setting into account one
has to move beyond the convenient but restrictive framework of Calvo wage contracts.
Accordingly, in this section I am going to present a model with Taylor wage contracts
that allows to incorporate all of these institutional details.
3.1 Wage-setting in the model with Taylor wage contracts
I use a two period Taylor model where the basic time-unit is again one semester. In
order to account for the observed heterogeneity of contracts, I assume that there are
three sectors: A, B and F. In the ﬂexible sector F wages are set every period according
to the ﬂex-wage expression (see appendix A.3): wF
t = ωn
t +pt +(σ +
ϕ
1−α)˜ yt. In sectors A
and B wage contracts are ﬁxed for two periods. Sector A negotiates the wage in periods
t =0 ,2,4,..., while sector B negotiates in periods t =1 ,3,5,.... There is a share τ of
ﬂexible wages and a share (1−τ) of two-period contracts where the relative size of sector
A (B) among all staggered wages is given by sA (sB =1− sA). Furthermore, a share γw
of all ﬁxed contracts is indexed to the rate of (current) inﬂation. Finally, it is assumed
that ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions are still characterized by a Calvo structure and that
all ﬁrms use labor from all sectors in proportion to their relative sizes τ,( 1− τ)sA and
(1 − τ)sB, respectively.
When compared to the model of section 2 one has to change two equations (see ap-
9Cf. also Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) and Knell and Stiglbauer (2009). The WDN data show also a
concentration of price changes in certain months. The degree of clustering is, however, less pronounced
than in the area of wage-setting (only 35% of the ﬁrms indicate to follow such a strategy) and I will
concentrate in the following on the clustering of wage changes.19
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where i = A for t =0 ,2,4,...and i = B for t =1 ,3,5,.... For the periods where sector
i ∈{ A,B} does not adjust wages it holds that wi
t = wi
t−1 + γwπt. Instead of (3) one has
to use the following deﬁnition of aggregate wages:





















The complete model is now given by the ﬁve equations (1), (4), (5), (19) and (20).
3.2 Real wage rigidity in the model with Taylor wage contracts
One can again use standard methods to solve the model (see appendix A.3). A direct
comparison between the solutions and the degrees of RWR for the formulations with
Calvo and with Taylor contracts is, however, not straightforward. First, even in the case
with symmetric sector sizes (i.e. sA = sB =1 /2) the Taylor model does not lead to a
formulation where the average real wage ¯ ωt depends just on ¯ ωt−1, at and ˜ yt (as in (17)).10
In particular, for the case with symmetric Taylor wage contracts ¯ ωt depends on ¯ ωt−1, at,





Second, for the case of asymmetric sector sizes the period-on-period RWR diﬀers
between the two subperiods and depends on the sector that sets the new wage. In order
to deal with these diﬃculties and to allow for comparisons I use a year-on-year formulation.
In appendix A.3 it is shown that the evolution of the average real wage can be written as:
¯ ω
i














The coeﬃcient ˜ δ measures the yoy rigidity of the average real wage. It is the same in
both sectors of the economy, independent of which sector sets the new wage. The reaction
of ¯ ωi
t to supply shocks, output gaps and inﬂation rates is, however, diﬀerent in the two
10Ih a v et ow r i t e¯ ωt for the average real wage in order to distinguish it from the real wage of the two
individual sectors. In particular: ωA
t ≡ wA
t − pt, ωB
t ≡ wB
t − pt,¯ ωA
t ≡ wt − pt in periods when sector
A is changing the wage while ¯ ωB
t+1 ≡ wt+1 − pt+1 in periods when sector B is changing. For symmetric
sector sizes the dynamics of ¯ ωA
t and ¯ ωB
t+1 are described by the same equation and one can thus drop the
sectoral index.20
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Figure 2: Comparison of annual RWR in the model with Calvo ((δ∗)
2) and with standard
Taylor (˜ δ) wage contracts (sA =1 /2,τ =0 ,γ w = 0). The measures of annual RWR are
based on a model where the basis time period is one semester and the average duration of
wage contracts is one year. For the case of Calvo wage contracts this means that θw =1 /2.
subperiods (as indicated by the indexation of the function fi(·)). This annual measure of
RWR ˜ δ can be compared with the annual measure of RWR in the Calvo model (given by
(δ∗)
2).
The correspondence between ˜ δ and (δ∗)
2 is further emphasized if one again derives a
backward-looking Phillips curve for the model with Taylor wage contracts. In appendix
A.3 I show how it can be written as:
π
p,i









t−2,a t,a t−1,a t−2) (22)
Using (18) one observes that for the model with Calvo contracts the expression for yoy in-





t−2+f(˜ yt, ˜ yt−1, ˜ yt−2,a t,a t−1,a t−2).
In Figure 2 I contrast (δ∗)
2 with ˜ δ for the standard model with Taylor contracts but
without ﬂexible wages, indexation or asymmetric sector sizes.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 and about here
One gets the following result:
Result 4 For the same average durations of price and wage contracts, the assumption of
Taylor wage contracts implies a considerably lower degree of real wage rigidity than the
assumption of Calvo wage contracts.21
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Figure 3: Comparison of annual RWR in three variants of the model with Taylor wage
contracts. In the upper panel the sector size sA is varied, in the middle panel a share τ of
all wages is assumed to be ﬂexible, while in the lower panel a fraction γw of all staggered
wages is indexed to current inﬂation.22
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For the baseline calibration (with θp =1 /3), the annual RWR implied by the model
with Calvo contracts is given by (δ∗)
2 =0 .31 while for Taylor contracts it is ˜ δ =0 .16. The
reason for the considerably lower rigidity in the model with Taylor contracts is the fact
that under the latter assumption there is an exactly given duration for every contract. In
the Calvo framework, on the other hand, some contracts might last for a very long time
span. This (unrealistic) feature considerably increases the extent of intrinsic persistence.
This fact is known from the literature (cf. Dixon and Kara, 2006) although it is mostly
ignored when calibrating the models.
In Figure 3 I show what happens if the additional institutional characteristics of wage-
setting are taken into account. The results can be summarized in the following way:
Result 5 In a model with Taylor wage contracts real wage rigidity is lower if
(i) the relative size of the sectors with ﬁxed wages is more asymmetric,
(ii) the share of the sector with ﬂexible wages τ is higher,
(iii) the percentage of indexation is lower.
RWR is related to the institutional characteristics in the expected direction. As far as
the relative magnitudes are concerned, Figure 3 reveals that the share of ﬂexible wages
has the largest impact. For a reasonable value of τ =0 .1 annual RWR is almost halved
to ˜ δ =0 .09. The eﬀect is less pronounced but still sizable for the other two parameters.
For γw =0 .25 RWR increases to ˜ δ =0 .19 while for sA =0 .25 it decreases to ˜ δ =0 .14.
Results 4 and 5 together suggest that the assumption of Calvo wage contracts is not
innocuous. In particular, it might be highly misleading to simply translate the available
information about the average duration of wage contracts into a parameter θw that is
then used in a model with Calvo wage contracts. Institutional details about the wage-
setting practices matter and they can have a considerable impact on the implied degree
of persistence and thus the dynamics of adjustment.
3.3 Discussion of the comparison between Calvo and Taylor
models
In an important article on the comparison between models with Calvo and with Taylor
contracts, Dixon and Kara (2006) have argued that one should use a comparison between
the average age or the average lifetime of the two kinds of contracts. Both of these23
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criteria amount to set θw = N−1
N+1,w h e r eN is the length of the Taylor wage contract. This
is diﬀerent from my calibration where (following the majority of the literature) I have
used θw =
N−1
N . For the two-period framework the Dixon-Kara approach thus implies
to set θw = 1
3 instead of θw = 1
2. Figures 1 and 2 suggest, however, that this does not
make a qualitative and only a small quantitative diﬀerence. The implied annual RWR
for the Calvo model drops from 0.31 to 0.27. If one also adapts the parameter for price
stickiness to θp = 1
5 then RWR comes out as 0.17 (for the Calvo model) and 0.09 (for the
Taylor model)—a similar diﬀerence as before. In the following, I will stick to the original
approach for two reasons. First, it is the prevalent approach in the related literature.
Second, and more importantly, the later empirical comparisons are based on ﬁrm surveys
in which the relevant questions did not refer to the average age or lifetime of contracts
but rather to the frequency of wage and price changes (Druant et al., 2009). In this case,
as shown in Dixon and Kara (2006), an accurate comparison does in fact involve to set
θi = N−1
N .
3.4 Discussion of the time structure
Before turning to the empirical data I want to brieﬂy deal with two issues that are related
to the time structure of the model. First, how large is the bias introduced by working
with a semester as the basic time-unit in both the Calvo and the Taylor model? Second,
is it possible to stick to the standard Taylor structure of two-period-staggering while still
allowing for an average wage duration that is longer or shorter than one year? The latter
question is particularly important when trying to match the model with the empirical
data.
In appendix B I deal with both questions and I show there that these are in fact
nonnegligible issues. As far as the ﬁrst issue is concerned, appendix B.1 illustrates, e.g.,
that the baseline calibration of a model with Calvo wage contracts and with semesters as
the basic time units underestimates the RWR by 36% when compared to a model with
quarters as the basic time unit. The underestimation is even larger when it is compared
to a model with months (53%) or days (62%) as the basic time unit. For cross-country
comparisons, however, this issue is less important since the eﬀects on the relative ranking
and the cross-country variation are moderate.
As far as the second timing issue is concerned I present in appendix B.2 a straight-
forward method to allow in the Taylor framework for average wage durations that are
diﬀerent from one year. The main idea behind the procedure is to redeﬁne the length of24
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the basic time unit as one half of the average wage duration. The time discount factor
and the parameter capturing the degree of price stickiness have then to be adapted such
as to conform to this new timing. The results suggest that the approximate method will
lead to plausible results as long as average price duration is not too much shorter than
average wage duration.
4 Survey evidence on nominal rigidities and what
they imply for real wage rigidity
In this section I am going to analyze whether the EHL model implies plausible sizes and
cross-country patterns of RWR when calibrated to real-world data on price- and wage-
setting. Furthermore, I will study how sensitive the results are to diﬀerent assumption
concerning the detailed characteristics of wage-setting institutions.
To this end, I use the results from ﬁrm surveys that have been conducted in a number
of European countries in the context of the ESCB’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN).
Aggregate data and a discussion of the results can be found in Druant et al. (2009). In
Table 1 I summarize some country-speciﬁc details that are relevant for the calibration of
the EHL model.
Insert Table 1 about here
Columns 1 and 2 contain the measures for the average duration of prices and wages
(Table 5 in Druant et al., 2009). They indicate that the degree of price stickiness is rather
similar across European countries. It ranges from 8.4 months (Lithuania) to 10.7 months
(Hungary) and for the Euro-area countries the span is even smaller (from 9 to 10 months).
The duration of wages is on average higher than the one for prices and also cross-country
diﬀerences are more pronounced. This is the expected result given the diﬀerences in wage-
setting institutions and practices. Wage duration is shortest for Slovenia, Lithuania and
Spain (around 12 months) and ranges up to 15 months for countries like the Netherlands,
the Czech Republic and Poland. Italy seems to be a special case since it has an average
duration of wages of almost two years.11
Columns 3 to 5 report summary statistics about other important characteristics of
wage-setting. First, I have used the raw data on the percentages of new wage agreements
11This creates problems for some of the calculations based on the assumption of Taylor wage contracts.
Therefore I omit Italy from the following cross-country comparisons.25
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Table 1: Survey evidence on nominal rigidities and other features of wage-setting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Duration (in months) Sector Size Flexibility Indexation
Prices Wages sA τ γw
Austria (AUT) 9.1 12.5 0.35 0.07 0.1
Belgium (BEL) 9.9 12.6 0.45 0.23 0.98
Spain (ESP) 9.7 11.9 0.2 0.12 0.55
France (FRA) 10.1 12 0.46 0.2 0.06
Greece (GRC) 10.2 11.9 0.38 0.34 0.2
Ireland (IRL) 8.5 12.8 0.42 0.15 0.05
Italy (ITA) 9.5 20.3 0.44 0.04 0.02
Netherlands (NLD) 9.1 13.9 0.28 0.11 0
Portugal (PRT) 9.5 12.9 0.19 0.06 0.09
Czech Republic (CZE) 9.7 14.6 0.34 0.12 0.08
Estonia (EST) 10 12.7 0.41 0.21 0.04
Hungary (HUN) 10.7 13.8 0.27 0.03 0.11
Lithuania (LTU) 8.4 11.4 0.47 0.45 0.11
Poland (POL) 9.5 15.4 0.45 0.14 0.07
Slovenia (SVN) 9.6 11.8 0.45 0.28 0.23
Total (ALL) 9.6 14.9 0.37 0.12 0.15
Note: The numbers contained in this table are primarily based on results from the WDN survey as
presented in Druant et al. (2009). The information in columns 1 and 2 stems from their Table 5, the
numbers in columns 4 and 5 from their Tables 4 and 7, respectively. For the calculation of sA Ih a v e
used the raw data and the procedure described in footnote 12.26
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that are concluded in each month to calculate an indicator for the clustering of wage
contracts sA. The data show that despite the typically rather large share of wages that
are renewed in January, the calculated amount of asymmetry is on average rather small
(average: sA =0 .37).12 Second, for the numbers in column 4 I take the information in
Table 4 of Druant et al. (2009) about the percentage of wages that are set more frequently
than once a year and I use them as my approximate measure for the share τ of ﬂexible
wages. The average value of 12% looks plausible, in particular if one takes the existence of
new jobs and job-to-job changes into account for which wages are typically set in a rather
ﬂexible manner.13 Finally, I measure the extent of wage indexation γw—as reported in
column 5—by the percentage of ﬁrms that have reported to use automatic indexation
of wages to either past or expected inﬂation (Table 7 in Druant et al., 2009). This is
true for an average of 15% of all ﬁrms, where in Belgium and Spain the percentages are
exceptionally high.
I use the numbers in Table 1 to calculate country-speciﬁc degrees of RWR. Figure 4
compares the estimations that are based on the model with Calvo wage contracts with
the one based on standard Taylor contracts (sa =1 /2,τ =0 ,γ w =0 ) .
Insert Figure 4 about here
In line with the results of section 3 the annual RWR based on the model with Taylor
contracts is considerably lower (average: 0.17) than the one based on the model with
Calvo contracts (average: 0.35). The ranking of countries is not drastically aﬀected by
the assumptions about the nature of wage contracts although there are some notable
changes in position (involving, e.g., the Netherlands and Poland). Given that the average
duration of wages (15 months) and prices (10 months) is close to the assumption that is
used in the baseline calibration by Gal´ ı (2009) (12 months and 9 months, respectively)
it is not surprising that the average values for RWR based on European data are close
12In particular, I take the data to derive the proportion of new contracts in the ﬁrst relative to the second
semester, depending on diﬀerent assumptions about the beginning of a year: i.e. % new contracts Jan-Jun
% new contracts Jul-Dec,
% new contracts Feb-Jul
% new contracts Aug-Jan, ..., % new contracts Jun-Nov
% new contracts Dec-May. From these ratios one can derive speciﬁc sector sizes
s1
A to s6
A. The country-speciﬁc measure for clustering reported in column 3 of Table 1 is the average of
these values. Using just the ﬁrst element s1
A (i.e. the ﬁrst half-year is assumed to last from January to
June) leads to similar values (average: 0.34; the correlation to the values in Table 1 is 0.93). The biggest
diﬀerences are observed for Spain (s1
A =0 .14) and Portugal (s1
A =0 .1).
13The exact numbers can of course only be regarded as a rough approximation for wage ﬂexibility.
Complications might, e.g., arise if a fraction of wages that are said to be changed within a year are
adjusted according to some predetermined schedule (as is, e.g., the case in Greece). Nevertheless, the
data in Table 1 can serve as a ﬁrst indication for corss-country variation in wage ﬂexibility.27
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Figure 4: Comparison of the annual RWR implied by the theoretical model with either
Calvo or standard Taylor wage contracts (where sa =1 /2,τ =0 ,γ w =0 ) .
to the results based on the baseline calibration derived in sections 2 and 3. For either
assumption, however, one observes remarkably small diﬀerences in the implied RWR for
the large bulk of countries. For Calvo contracts most values are in the interval between
0.26 and 0.37 and for Taylor contract they range from 0.13 to 0.21. Only Ireland and
Lithuania stand out at the lower end and Hungary at the higher end.
Insert Figure 5 about here
In Figure 5 I use the institutional details reported in columns 3 to 5 of Table 1.
Including the information about asymmetric sector sizes does not have a huge impact.
The average RWR (0.16) is close to the value in the standard Taylor model (0.17) and
also the standard deviation remains almost unchanged. This follows from the fact that
the extent of asymmetry is in general rather small and also similar for most countries.
The only exceptions are Portugal (sA =0 .19) and Spain (sA =0 .2) for which one can
observe lower degrees of RWR and also a change in the country ranking.
The impact of the prevalence of ﬂexible wages is much more pronounced. Average
RWR decreases to 0.08, whereas cross-country variation increases. One can also observe28
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Taylor (standard)
Figure 5: Comparison of the RWR implied by diﬀerent variants of the model with Taylor
contracts. The pictures show the cases where (a) τ =0 ,γw =0a n dsA is country-
speciﬁc, (b) sA =1 /2, γw =0a n dτ is country-speciﬁc, (c) sA =1 /2, τ =0a n dγw
is country-speciﬁc and (d) where all sA, τ and γw are country-speciﬁc. The correlations
(rank-correlation) of the four cases with the standard model are given by: 0.91 (0.94), 0.5
(0.24), 0.51 (0.85) and 0.56 (0.34).29
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some remarkable changes in the relative ranking of countries, e.g. for Greece, Lithuania
and Slovenia that are characterized by the largest values for τ. The correlation (0.5) and
rank-correlation (0.24) with the standard Taylor model are rather low.
Taking wage indexation into account leads to considerable changes for two countries
where this is an widely-used practice. While for the other 13 countries the average RWR
increases only slightly (to 0.18) the increases is much larger for Belgium (from 0.19 to
0.47) and Spain (from 0.18 to 0.28).
Taking all three additional wage-setting characteristics into account one can observe
that they have a noticeable impact on the measure of RWR. The average is lower (0.08)
than in the standard case and one can again also observe some changes in the relative
position of countries. In fact, the rank correlation with the standard Taylor model is only
0.34.
To conclude this section it would be interesting to compare the model-based measures
for RWR with existing empirical evidence. Unfortunately, however, the latter is rather
scarce. Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007), e.g., do not provide an estimate or a “reasonable”
value for the (assumed) magnitude of RWR. In discussing the results they employ illus-
trative values between 0.5 and 0.9 (on a qoq basis), whereas Duval and Vogel (2007),
in a related set-up, choose values between 0.79 and 0.93. Others use a ﬁxed calibrated
value of γ =0 .5 (Blanchard and Gal´ ı, 2008) or γ =0 .6 (Faia, 2008). Using the European
survey data on price and wage-setting one can calculate the implied values for qoq RWR
based on the EHL model. They come out as 0.77 (Calvo wage contracts), 0.64 (standard
Taylor wage contracts) and 0.54 (Taylor wage contracts with institutional heterogeneity).
These theory-plus-survey-based values thus fall within the range of values assumed in the
framework based on the short-cut formulation.
In order to expand the scarce evidence on RWR in Europe, I have also performed a
regression analysis using various macroeconomic time series for the same set of 15 countries
that are covered in the WDN survey. Details of the analysis can be found in appendix C.
The empirical speciﬁcation is based on the theoretical model as given by (17) or (21) and
the time period is from 1990–2007 (for most EU15 countries) and 1995–2007 (for most
new member states). The estimated average level of qoq RWR comes out as 0.7 with a
standard deviation of 0.27.14 The estimates are thus in the neighborhood of the values
14The only other directly comparable cross-country estimates of RWR can be found in Abbritti and
Weber (2008). They use data from 13 OECD countries and for the time period 1970–1999. They report
an average qoq RWR of 0.7 (SD: 0.12). These values are similar to my own estimates despite the fact
that the two analyses diﬀer along important dimensions: they refer to diﬀerent countries (only four
are contained in both), they use diﬀerent time spans and they employ diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations30
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based on the theoretical models—slightly lower than the ones based on the model with
Calvo contracts (0.77) and larger than the ones based on the model with Taylor contracts
(0.64 and 0.54, respectively). It must be stressed, however, that the use of shorter basic
time units would increase the implied values of RWR for both assumptions about wage
contracts (see appendix B.1). Using quarters, e.g., increases average qoq RWR to 0.82
(for Calvo contracts) and to 0.72 (for standard Taylor wage contracts). Taken together,
one can thus state that the EHL model is in fact capable of generating degrees of RWR
that are of a similar magnitude as the assumed values in short-cut formulations and also
as empirical estimates.
Turning to the cross-country diﬀerences one can observe that the variations in RWR
implied by the standard theoretical models are much smaller than their empirical coun-
terparts. While my qoq estimates show a standard deviation of 0.27 it is only 0.02 for
the calculations based on the model with Calvo contracts and also only 0.02 for the one
based on standard Taylor contracts. The corresponding coeﬃcients of variations (CV) are
given by 0.39, 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. The inclusion of additional institutional details
increases the spread of RWR between countries. In particular, for the case where all
three characteristics are taken into account (cf. Figure 5 (d)) the cross-country variation
as measured by the SD is 0.05 despite the lower average value of RWR, implying a CV
of 0.1. This is still below the observed value of 0.39 but larger than in the case of the
standard models.
As a last point one might ask how the country rankings with respect to the calculated
and to the estimated degrees of RWR compare. The outcome is not completely conclu-
sive but it also supports the argument that institutional variety is important. Using all
15 countries, Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient is -0.09 for the model with Calvo
contracts but it increases to 0.24 if one uses the model with Taylor contracts and with
institutional heterogeneity.
Summing up, the results of this section show that the parsimonious EHL model is
in fact capable to explain reasonable amounts of average RWR. The additional inclusion
of three crucial characteristics of European wage-setting improves the ability of the the-
oretical model to also explain the observed degree of cross-country variation in RWR.
In this context it is important to note that I have only picked out three features that
could be incorporated into the standard model in a straightforward way and for which
cross-country evidence is readily available. It seems obvious that the inclusion of further
(Abbritti and Weber (2006), e.g., estimate their equation in levels while I use growth rates).31
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institutional details would cause an even higher degree of cross-country variation. In or-
der to get an accurate description of the dynamic properties and transmission channels in
diﬀerent economies it is imperative to reﬂect cross-country diﬀerences in the institutional
set-up in an accurate way. It does not seem enough to focus just on the observed (or
estimated) average duration of prices and wages and to translate these ﬁgures into sym-
metric hazard rates θp and/or θw. Reasonable cross-country comparisons require a closer
look at institutional peculiarities and the detailed organization of industrial relations.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have used a standard DSGE model to show that the synchronous presence
of a nominal price and a nominal wage rigidity leads to real wage rigidity. I found that
the institutional details of wage determination can have a considerable impact on the
extent of RWR. If wages are assumed to be set for a ﬁxed length of time (Taylor wage
contracts) then the resulting real wages are much less rigid than in the case of Calvo wage
contracts with an identical average duration. Furthermore, RWR is lower if wage-setting
is clustered in particular months, if the share of ﬂexible wages is higher and if there is less
wage indexation.
I have used recent survey evidence on price- and wage-setting practices for 15 European
countries in order to study whether the predictions of the parsimonious theoretical model
are in line with empirical estimates. The calibrated EHL model based on the survey data
for the average duration of prices and wages implies a quarterly RWR between 0.6 and 0.8.
These values are in line with empirical estimations and also with the assumptions that are
typically made in models with short-cut formulations for RWR. The model with Calvo
contracts and with standard Taylor contracts are, however, unable to match the observed
cross-country variations of RWR. This follows from the fact that the average price and
wage durations are rather similar across countries. In order to get a better agreement
with the cross-country variation one has to take additional institutional characteristics of
wage-setting into account. The survey data document, e.g., that European countries show
larger diﬀerences with respect to clustering, contract length heterogeneity and indexation.
The inclusion of these dimensions increases the cross-country variation (as measured by
the standard deviation or the coeﬃcient of variation), although it is still somewhat below
the empirically observed extent of variation.
This shortfall is likely to be due to further institutional diﬀerences from which this32
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paper abstracts. First, I have captured the heterogeneity of contract length by the per-
centage of ﬂexible wages. In reality, however, one can also observe country-speciﬁc shares
of long-term wage contracts (≥ 2 years) and this could lead to more cross-country variation
in the implied degrees of RWR. Second, wage-setting is also inﬂuenced by the structure of
industrial relations. There are important diﬀerences in European countries with respect
to coordination and centralization of wage bargaining. Knell and Stiglbauer (2009), e.g.,
have shown that the institution of wage leadership (that can be observed in Germany, Aus-
tria and some Scandinavian countries) implies a lower degree of inﬂation persistence and
will—pari passu—also be associated with a lower degree of RWR. Finally, cross-country
diﬀerences in employment protection and the unemployment beneﬁt system and also in
the degree of openness and in the structure of ﬁnancial intermediation are likely to have
an eﬀect on the transmission mechanism and on real wage rigidity. The incorporation of
these and related institutional details into standard DSGE models is a promising area for
future research.33
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Appendices
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 The model with exogenous output (section 2.3)
From the deﬁnitions of λp and λw it follows that: lim
θp→0
λp = ∞ and lim
θw→0
λw = ∞.S o
using the deﬁnition ˜ λ ≡ 1
1+β+λw+λp it follows that lim
θp→0
˜ λ = 0 and lim
θw→0
˜ λ =0 .F r o mt h e
deﬁnition of δ (equation (15)) one thus gets that: lim
˜ λ→0
δ =0 /0. Using l’Hospital’s rule one










In a similar vein one can calculate that lim
˜ λ→0
δ(λw+λp)






Therefore for θp → 0o rθw → 0 one can write that ωt =¯ ωn+ψn
ωaat or (using the deﬁnitions
of mrst, ψn
ωa and ψn
ya): ωt−¯ ωn = mrst. This is in fact the expected result for the situation
with completely ﬂexible prices.
For complete persistence (θp =1 ,θw = 1), on the other hand, one gets that λp =0 ,
λw =0a n d˜ λ = 1
1+β and thus δ = 1. In this case it thus holds that ωt = ωt−1.
A.2 Solution to the model with Calvo wage contracts (section
2)
A.2.1 Basic Solution
































1 thus gives the degree of real wage rigidity in a speciﬁcation where one









1¯ ωn and Ψω
0 =( 1−Ψω
1)¯ ωn and thus the system (23) to (25) could as well be written in















3vt and (ωt − ¯ ωn)=Ψ ω
1 (ωt−1 − ¯ ωn)+Ψ ω
2at +37
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A.2.2 Solution in terms of ωt−1, at and ˜ yt
Using (24) vt c a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt e r m so f˜ yt: vt = 1
Ψ
y







serting this in (23) and (25) equilibrium inﬂation and the equilibrium real wage can be
written just in terms of the past real wage (ωt−1), the output gap (˜ yt) and a supply shock
















































































































. The other coeﬃ-

































A.2.3 A Phillips curve (π
p
t depending on π
p
t−1)
One can also derive an equation that is fairly close to the traditional Phillips curve for-
mulation. First, lag (23) by one period and then use (ωt−1 − ¯ ωn)=Ψ ω
1 (ωt−2 − ¯ ωn)+
Ψω
2at−1 +Ψ ω







































































0 are fulﬁlled it holds that in a
steady state π
p
t =0 ,˜ yt =0a n dωt =¯ ωn.38
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Again one can use (24) (and a lagged version of (24)) to express vt and vt−1 in terms of












































































This corresponds to equation (18) in the text.
A.3 Solution to the model with Taylor wage contracts (section
3)
A.3.1 The wage-setting equation
I use a variant of the Taylor model where there are two sectors A and B with contracts
of a ﬁxed (two-period) length and one sector F where wages are set in a ﬂexible way. I
start the description with the sectors with staggered wages.
There is no explicit treatment of the model with Taylor contracts in Gal´ ı (2008).16 It
is, however, straightforward to derive a wage-setting equation following analogous steps
as in Gal´ ı (2008, chap. 6.1.2.1). Instead of equation (10) in chapter 6 the two-period
Taylor model implies the following optimal wage-setting equation (for sector i ∈{ A,B}










Et+k {μw + mrst+k + εwϕwt+k + pt+k}
One can also follow Gal´ ı (2008) and deﬁne ˆ μw
t ≡ μw
t −μw as the deviation of the economy’s
(log) average wage markup μw























Using other deﬁnitions and transformations one can also derive that ˆ μw







16The only exception is the end-of-chapter exercise 3.5 that deals with optimal price-setting in the
Taylor model.39
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This formulation is used in the text as equation (19). For the periods where sector i ∈
{A,B} does not adjust wages I assume that a fraction of ﬁrms γw indexes the previosuly
determined wage to the rate of (current) inﬂation, i.e. wi
t = wi
t−1 + γwπt.
The ﬂexible wage set in sector F follows from the ﬂex-wage condition (cf. Gal´ ı, 2008,
p. 133) that ω
flex
t =( σ +
ϕ




t + pt +( σ +
ϕ
1−α)˜ yt.
The average wage in period t is the weighted average of the three sectoral wages, i.e.:




















This is equation (20) in the text. The rest of the model is the same as in the standard
case.
A.3.2 Basic Solution





















































For t =0 ,2,4,... one has that i = A and j = B while for t =1 ,3,5,...it holds that
i = B and j = A. For the symmetric case with sA = sB = 1
2 the various coeﬃcients are






4 . This, however, is no longer true
for the asymmetric case with sA  = sB where it is thus important to distinguish between
the determination of the key variables in sectors A and B. The numerical calculations40
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2 = 0 (33)
A.3.3 The period-on-period and year-on-year RWR
For the sake of comparison it is better to express all relations in terms of ˜ yt instead of vt.




















. From this one
can derive an expression for the real wage ωi
t ≡ wi
t − pi















































































Since the coeﬃcients might be diﬀerent across the two sectors also the reaction of ωA
t to
ωB
t−1 might be diﬀerent from the reaction of ωB
t+1 to ωA
t etc. For this reason (and in order
to make the cases with diﬀerent weights sA and sB comparable) it is useful to write the
real wage ωi
t in sector i as a function of its own last optimally set real wage wage ωi
t−2.















4 ˜ yt +Γ
ωi



















































































































































17Intuitively, these relationships follow from the fact that the “order” of normal variables on each side
of equations (30) to (32) has to be the same. Unfortunately, I have not been able to show analytically
that these relationships have to hold. Nevertheless, they have been conﬁrmed for all numerical cases that
have been scrutinized.41
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Note that the coeﬃcient Γωi
1 that determines the extent of (year-on-year) rigidity of


















































For comparisons across models and across countries etc. one is, however, not so much
interested in the rigidity of the sectoral real wage but in the rigidity of the average real
wages given by ¯ ωA
t ≡ wt − pA
t and ¯ ωB
t+1 ≡ wt+1 − pB

















































Iu s eh e r e¯ ωA
t and ¯ ωB
t+1 to distinguish clearly between the average real wage in periods when
sector A sets the new wage and when sector B does so. One can take the expressions for
ωA
t and ωB




t−2 +( 1− τ)sBπA
t−2 − τ







˜ yt+1 one can derive an expressions
for ¯ ωA
t as a function of ¯ ωA






steps one can also write ¯ ωB
t+1 as a function of ¯ ωB






t−1. These derivations lead to the result that the coeﬃcient on ¯ ωA
t−2 in the ﬁrst expression
and on ¯ ωB
t−1 in the second expression are identical and given by Γω
1. This means that the
yoy rigidity of the average real wage is the same in both periods, independent of which
18The complete equations are rather long and they have been calculated in a Mathematica ﬁle which
is available upon request.42
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sector sets the new wages. Note, however, that the reaction of the average real wage to
supply shocks and monetary policy shocks is diﬀerent in the two subperiods. And note
furthermore that the average real wage also depends on current and past inﬂation rates.19
A.3.4 A Phillips curve













t and ˜ yB
t−1 to solve (using (33)) for πA
t as a function of πB




t−1 can be written as a function of πA
t−2, at−1, at−2,˜ yB
t−1 and ˜ yA
t−2.T a k i n g
these two together one can thus write πA
t as a function of last year’s inﬂation πA
t−2 and
present and past levels of at and ˜ yt.20.
Following these steps the term on lagged inﬂation comes out as Γω
1.21 This is the same
result as in the case of the standard model where the coeﬃcient of RWR δ∗ in (27) is
the same as in the backward looking Phillips curve (see (29)). So Γω
1 in the model with
(symmetric or asymmetric) Taylor wage contracts corresponds to (δ∗)
2 in the model with
Calvo wage contracts. This is the magnitude I focus in the text when I compare diﬀerent
models and speciﬁcations (i.e., ˜ δ ≡ Γω
1).
19It is interesting in this context to point out a mirror-inverted result. In the Taylor model ¯ ωt depends




t−1 while the newly set real wage ωi
t can be written just as a function
of ωi
t−1, at and ˜ yt. In the Calvo formulation, on the other hand, it is exactly the opposite. The average
real wage is just a function of ¯ ωt−1, at and ˜ yt while ωi
t depends on ωi





20Details can again be found in a Mathematica ﬁle available upon request
21Note that this is also the coeﬃcient of πB
t−1 that one gets if πB
t+1 is expressed as a function of πB
t−1
etc. So Γω
1 is the relevant persistence term in both periods and sectors.43
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B Notes on the time structure of the models
B.1 The impact of the choice of the basic time unit on RWR
The standard models with Calvo and with Taylor wage contracts is based on a structure
where the basic time unit corresponds to one semester. In the two-period Taylor model
this implies that a wage contract lasts for one year (=two semesters). This assumption
has been primarily made for convenience and in order to be able to deal with the case of
asymmetric sector sizes in a coherent and comprehensible way. The assumption diﬀers,
however, from the related literature where the basic time unit is normally deﬁned as
one quarter (which is in line with the frequency of the available macroeconomic data).
When calibrating the model I had to be careful to choose the correct parameter values.
E.g., in the baseline case I have used a discount rate of β =0 .98 and a price adjustment




(or 270 days) which is a common value in the related literature (cf. Gal´ ı, 2008, 2009).
Despite the identical average duration of price and wage contracts it is nevertheless
clear that the choice of the basic time unit has an eﬀect on the dynamic properties of
the model. In particular, a system where the “Calvo fairy” appears on a daily basis will
imply higher persistence (for the same average contract duration) than a system where
changes are only allowed on a quarterly or semiannually frequency. In order to study the
extent of this eﬀect I have solved the basic models under the assumption of shorter basic
time units.
For the model with Calvo wage contracts this has been straightforward since it only
involves some reparameterizations. In particular, if frequdenotes the length of the basic
time unit (measured in days), the structural parameter that corresponds to an average
contract duration of x days is given by: θp =1−
frequ
x ,w h e r ex ≥ frequ.T h e t i m e
discount rate is given by β =0 .96
frequ
360 . Following the same steps as sketched in appendix
A.2 one gets an estimation for δ∗
frequ. This can be transformed into an annual measure of







frequ. The results of this exercise are illustrated
in Figure B.1 where I have used the baseline calibration and held the average length of
wage contracts constant at 360 days.
Insert Figure B.1 about here
One observes that the choice of the basic time units has a nonnegligible eﬀect on the
estimated degree of RWR. The shorter the basic time unit, the higher the RWR. For an44
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Figure B.1: Comparison of the model with Calvo wage contracts with diﬀerent durations of
the basic time period. The ﬁgures are based on the parameters of the baseline calibration.
The average duration of wage contracts is set equal to 360 days for all speciﬁcations while
the average duration of price contracts is shown on the x-axis.
average price duration of 270 days, e.g., the annual RWR is given by 0.31 (semester), 0.42
(quarter), 0.48 (month) and 0.50 (day). The intuition behind this result is clear. For the
case of quarterly frequencies of price changes an average duration of 90 days is the most
ﬂexible situation one can imagine (and θp = 0 in this case). If one takes into account,
however, that prices can in general be changed more frequently then an average duration
of 90 days looks already rather sticky. Assuming a day as the correct basic time unit, the
“true RWR” is higher than indicated by the values based on longer time units: by 62%
(semester), 19% (quarter) and 6% (month). The larger the average price duration, the
smaller the bias gets. For a price duration of 360 days, e.g., the corresponding percentages
are reduced to: 32% (semester), 14% (quarter) and 5% (month).
The same exercise can also be performed for the (symmetric) Taylor model, even
though in this case the calculations are less straightforward. For the Calvo model the
degree of annual RWR δ
∗,annual
frequ can be directly derived from the solution of the period
model (i.e. from δ∗
frequ). This is not possible (or at least intractable) for the model with
Taylor wage contracts. In fact, already for the two-period structure is has been rather
diﬃcult to derive an equation of the form (22) (see also appendix A.3). For the cases
with shorter basic time units such an explicit derivation of ˜ δfrequ is no longer feasible.
Therefore I have chosen an alternative strategy to come up with comparable measures of
RWR for diﬀerent timing assumptions. In particular, the derivations of the two-period
model have suggested that the extent of RWR can be accurately inferred from an empirical45
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Figure B.2: Comparison of the model with Taylor wage contracts with diﬀerent durations
of the basic time period. The ﬁgures are again based on the parameters of the baseline
calibration, the average duration of wage contracts is set equal to 360 days for all spec-
iﬁcations and the average duration of price contracts is shown on the x-axis. The green
line is based on the exact measure ˜ δ as stated in (36) while the diﬀerent-colored lines are
based on regressions of current inﬂation πt on the annual lag of inﬂation and on other
explanatory variables as described in the text.
estimation where the rate of inﬂation πt is regressed on the year-on-year lagged inﬂation
πt−2 and measures for the output gap and the supply shocks for all intermediate periods
(i.e. from at to at−2 and from ˜ yt to ˜ yt−2). As shown in (34) the coeﬃcient on πt−2 is
equal to ˜ δ and the estimated regression coeﬃcient on πt−2 should thus give an accurate
estimation of RWR. I have simulated 50.000 data points (assuming ρa =0=ρv =0a n d
σa = σv = 1) and ran a regression like that. The result is plotted as the orange line in
Figure B.2, together with the exact (i.e. analytically derived) measure (green line) given
by ˜ δ (as given in (36)). The two lines are indistinguishable.
Insert Figure B.2 about here
Taking the regression results for the two-period model as a suggestive starting point
I have also solved the Taylor model with 4 and with 12 subperiods.22 I have then again
simulated a large number of datapoints and I have run regressions that allow me to infer
the degree of RWR. In particular, these regressions are of the form:
πt = ˜ δquartπt−4 + f(at,...,a t−4, ˜ yt,...,˜ yt−4) (39)
22The case of daily basic time units (360 subperiods) was too cumbersome to analyze, as was the case
with asymmetric sector sizes.46
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and
πt = ˜ δmonthπt−12 + f(at,...,a t−12, ˜ yt,...,˜ yt−12) (40)
The results are plotted in Figure B.2. They are qualitatively similar to the case of
Calvo wage contracts, although now the underestimation of RWR due to a longer basic
time unit is somewhat larger. For quarters as the basic time unit one gets ˜ δ =0 .28 instead
of ˜ δ =0 .16 (while for the model with Calvo contracts the diﬀerence is (δ∗)
2 =0 .42 vs.
(δ∗)
2 =0 .31). The bias again decreases for larger price durations. In drawing Figures
B.1 and B.2 I have kept the length of the wage contract constant (at 360 days). For
this assumption the ﬁgures illustrate that for both the case with Calvo and with Taylor
contracts the choice of the basic time unit does not aﬀect the ranking of countries. This
might, however, change once one compares countries that diﬀer both in their duration of
prices and of wages. In the next section I say more on this issue.
B.2 Accounting for diﬀerent durations of wage contracts in the
two-period Taylor model
The standard two-period Taylor model ﬁxes the average duration of the staggered wage
contracts at two semesters=one year. In order to be able to use the simple two-period
framework also for cross-country comparisons and to allow for longer or shorter average
wage durations it is necessary to make some adaptions. I use a straightforward method
to make these adjustments that is based on the idea to take the average duration of wage
contracts dur from the data and deﬁne frequ=
dur
2 as the length of the basic time unit.
Due to this change in units one has to re-specify the discount rate and the parameter that
captures price stickiness. In particular, β =0 .96
frequ
360 and θp =1−
frequ
x ,w h e r ex stands
for the average duration of price contracts (in days) and x ≥ frequ. Using these values
one can then follow the same steps as in chapter A.3 to calculate a value ˘ δ as a measure of







The results for some alternative assumptions about the average duration of wage
contracts are shown in Figure B.3.
Insert Figure B.3 about here
Intuition (and the experience from working with Calvo wage contracts) suggests that
a longer average duration of wages should be associated—ceteris paribus—with a higher
23Note that for the symmetric standard model one gets that ˜ δ = ˘ δ2 (cf. (36)).47
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Wage Dur.: 720 days
Wage Dur.: 540 days
Wage Dur.: 360 days
Wage Dur.: 240 days
Figure B.3: Comparison of the two-period Taylor model with diﬀerent durations of the
average wage contract (in days). The ﬁgures are based on the parameters of the baseline
calibration. The average duration of price contracts is shown on the x-axis.
RWR. As one can observe from Figure B.3 this requirement is in fact borne out by the
method described above as long as the average price duration is not too much shorter
than the average wage duration. Assuming, e.g., that the two nominal variables are
characterized by the same average duration one gets RWRs equal to 0.12, 0.24, 0.39 and
0.49 when the duration is 240, 360, 540 and 720 days, respectively. On the other hand,
one sees that if this condition about the relative duration is not fulﬁlled then one might
get erroneous results. If, e.g., wage agreements are written for two years while prices
last on average for less than one year then the approximate method would imply a RWR
of zero, which is obviously wrong. The data used for the cross-country comparisons,
however, do not show such vast discrepancies in relative duration for most countries. On
the other hand, Figure B.3 also suggests that the procedure is less than perfect and that
country rankings might change if the diﬀerence between the two durations is too large.
One should thus best regard it as an approximate method that is helpful to make countries
with diﬀerent wage durations comparable.24
C Empirical estimations of real wage rigidity
The starting point of the empirical speciﬁcation are equations (17) and (21) that are
derived from theoretical models. The solution to the model with Calvo wage contracts
24Needless to say that a model based on monthly basic time units would allow for more accurate
results. Such a ﬁner timing structure is, however, computationally rather involved, especially in as far as
asymmetric sector sizes are concerned.48
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implies that the current real wage ωt is a function of ωt−1,˜ yt and at, while the model





t−1. The latter model thus encompasses the ﬁrst one and it is chosen as the
benchmark speciﬁcation.
I use quarterly data and in order to deal with issues of stationarity and seasonality
I estimate the model in yoy diﬀerences (i.e. in yoy growth rates). In particular, the
estimation equation for each country is:





I measure the real wage ωt by nominal compensation per employee deﬂated by the GDP
deﬂator; labor productivity at by real GDP divided by the level of employment; the output
gap ˜ yt by the deviation of real GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott-trend (λ = 1600); inﬂation
π
p
t = pt−pt−1 as the period-on-period change in the GDP deﬂator. The main data source
is the OECD Economic Outlook database with some exceptions. The data on wages for
Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands are from national accounts and for Portugal, Poland
and Hungary from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database. In addition,
GDP for Hungary is from the MEI and employment for Estonia from the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) database provided by the IMF. The IFS is also the source of all
data for Lithuania and Slovenia.
For the EU15 I typically have the complete set of time series from 1980 onwards
with the exception of Greece (only from 2000) and Portugal (only from 1995). For the
new member states I have complete datasets from 1995 onwards with the exception of
Lithuania and Slovenia where the data only start in 1999. In order to get comparable
results the focus is on a benchmark time period (when available) from 1990–2007.
Insert Table C.1 and Figure C.1 about here
In table C.1 I list the estimates for qoq RWR from countrywise estimations based on
(41). The average RWR is given by 0.7 with a SD of 0.27. Focusing just on EU15 countries
gives a similar average of 0.74 (SD: 0.27). The use of unemployment rates as a measure
of business cycle conditions also leads to similar results. In ﬁgure C.1 I contrast these
empirical with the theory-plus-survey-based values for the model with Calvo contracts
and the one with extended Taylor contracts. The correspondence (as measured by the
coeﬃcients of correlation and rank correlation) between these two classes of measures of
RWR increases if one uses the Taylor model with institutional heterogeneity.49
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.4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65
RWR from the model with Taylor contracts (and institutional heterogeneity)
Figure C.1: Comparison of the quarterly RWR based on macroeconomic data and RWR
implied by the theoretical model with Calvo and with Taylor wage contracts (including
heterogeneous contracts, clustering and indexation). The correlation (rank-correlation)
of the theory-based and the empirical values is given by: 0.25 (-0.09) [Calvo] and 0.32
(0.24) [extended Taylor].50
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